Working Paper 193

Conducive Conditions: Livelihood Interventions in Southern Somalia

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This Working Paper forms part of a series that reviews the range of ways in which livelihoods approaches are currently used by operational agencies and researchers working in situations of chronic conflict and political instability (SCCPI). The aim of the series is to document current practice so that useful lessons can be learned and applied to ensure for more effective policies, needs assessment, and aid programming to support livelihoods during protracted conflict. Many of these lessons from each of the individual papers are summarised in a synthesis paper. The series also includes an annotated bibliography and a paper outlining the conceptual issues relating to the applications of livelihoods approaches to SCCPI.

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Contents

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Acronyms

ASP	Agricultural support project (SC–UK)
CIP	Community Intervention Project (ICRC)
CSP	Country Strategy Paper (SC–UK)
DC	District Commissioner
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGM	Female genital mutilation
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit (FAO)
GPS	Global Programme Strategy (SC–UK)
GRIP	Gravity irrigation projects
HEA	Household Economy Approach (SC–UK)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
MCH	Mother and child healthcare
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PIP	Pump irrigation project
SACB	Somali Aid Coordination Body
SC–UK	Save the Children–UK
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNRS	Somali National Region State
SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society
SRRC	Somalia Rehabilitation and Reconciliation Committee
TG	Transitional Government (Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation for Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
Watsan	Water and sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme

Vernacular terms

Arta	Djibouti-hosted national reconciliation process that resulted in the formation of the Transitional Government, in mid-2000
Berkads	Lined water catchment
Deyr	Wet season between October and December
Diya	Blood compensation
Gabaan	Type of lactating animal that gives small amounts of milk but gives it all year round, as opposed to only on a seasonal basis
Jilaal	Long dry season between December and April
Sharia	Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran, prescribing both religious and secular duties, and in some cases retributive penalties for law breaking

Summary

This Working Paper considers interventions by two organisations, in light of the working paper theme of linking livelihood approaches with recent work in the area of political economy. Save the Children–UK (SC–UK) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) work in southern Somalia and aim to support livelihoods within a situation of chronic conflict and political instability (SCCPI).

This paper describes the context in which the two organisations work in terms of the livelihood systems within southern Somalia, political economy themes as they relate to southern Somalia and programming possibilities in the area. The authors critically review two livelihood support programmes as case studies. These case studies aim to draw out the ways in which and to what extent the programmes of SC–UK and ICRC support livelihoods. How, and to what extent, the analysis of the political economy informs decision making by the two organisations is also explored.

The review of SC–UK's work in Belet Weyn highlights the ways in which the Agricultural Support Project (ASP) aims to push staff development and community participation to the forefront of programming decisions in an effort to move from 'free' seed and tools distributions to a sustainable agricultural project. The review of the ICRC Community Intervention Project (CIP) emphasises the challenges inherent in the change of programming that the CIP presents to ICRC. These challenges include the targeting of beneficiaries and facilities, the use of cash in the context of political instability, and the influence of leadership structures and conflict dynamics.

The concluding section draws out the differences and commonalties in the approaches of the two organisations. Evidence from both case studies highlights the important role of contextual preconditions in terms both of the changing nature of the working environment in southern Somalia and the characteristics of particular organisations. The use of political economy information can be most clearly associated in the case studies with decision-making on the logistics of programme implementation, and is embedded in day-to-day action rather than in reference to a clearly defined model.

Finally, information about the strengths and weaknesses highlighted in the case studies is used to indicate the 'conducive conditions' required for livelihoods programming in SCCPI.

1 Introduction

This Working Paper considers interventions by two organisations, Save the Children–UK (SC–UK) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in southern Somalia. Both organisations work in a situation of chronic conflict and political instability (SCCPI) and have, in different ways, tackled the concept of supporting livelihoods within this context. Responses from both organisations have looked beyond the 'traditional' forms of relief aid in responding to humanitarian crises. The paper aims to describe the interventions and discuss them in the light of the Working Paper theme of linking livelihoods with political economy approaches. By illustrating actual interventions by operational organisations, the paper aims to give insight into the issues facing organisations when implementing programmes that attempt to provide principled support to livelihoods in a SCCPI. The achievements and limitations of these specific interventions in meeting the challenges posed are reviewed in case studies. Comparisons of the programming approaches of the two agencies follow the case studies.

Neither SC–UK nor ICRC has used a particular 'livelihood' model to design, implement or evaluate the programmes illustrated as case studies in this paper. Both organisations have stated that support to livelihoods is an objective that the programmes aim to fulfil. This paper aims to illustrate in which way and to what extent their programmes do support livelihoods. Neither SC–UK nor ICRC has explicitly referred to a 'political economy approach' during interviews or in documents pertaining to the programmes in question. Both organisations include some analysis of the political economy in programming decisions. This paper aims to explore to what extent this is the case, and how the information informs decision making.

1.1 Introduction to the context

1.1.1 Southern Somalia

Southern Somalia's last decade can be defined as chronically politically unstable. Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in January 1991 Somalia has been without a central government. 1991/2 saw the collapse of the state, inter-clan warfare, widespread banditry and looting, displacement and famine. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis lost their lives during this period; large-scale refugee flows were generated together with internal displacement. Much of Mogadishu was destroyed and widespread damage was inflicted on agricultural infrastructure.

The United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM) was active in the country between 1993 and 1994. While some humanitarian needs were met by the international community during this period, the peace operation was drawn into armed conflict with the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and failed to bring about national reconciliation. 'When the UNOSOM forces departed from Somalia in March 1995, it left the country still divided, without a central government, and with an economic infrastructure mostly still in ruins' (Menkhaus, 2000:1.1). Since 1995 much of the population of southern Somalia has remained vulnerable to poor food security and has access to limited if any health care. Chronic problems of armed clashes and lawlessness exist in both urban and rural areas.

The establishment of a Transitional Government (TG) in August 2000 was the product of lengthy dialogue and negotiation. The hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialised. 'Most Western donors have adopted a "wait and see" approach and made aid conditional on signs of "effective government"' (UNDP, 2001:54). The administration currently does not exercise any influence over most of the country, it attempts to govern on the basis of minimal financial resources and relies on support from the business community in Mogadishu. This support is waning as

merchants consider that their investment is not yielding expected results. The importation of large quantities of Somali shillings has been to the detriment of the value of the currency and caused hyperinflation. The prospects for the success of forthcoming reconciliation talks in Nairobi between the TG and rival faction leaders are considered to be poor (The Economist, 2002:27).

While the early 1990s saw relatively cohesive armed factions, the splintering of factions from the mid-1990s means that most conflict is now within rather than between major clans (Menkhaus, 2000:1). Conflicts tend to be local in character rather than protracted and widespread. There are pockets of stability and there are geographical areas that, while generally unstable, have periods of stability. Somalia's political and economic conditions are dramatically different today from those of the early 1990s when 'state failure translated into chronic and destructive civil war' (ICG, 2002:2). Unlike the situation in northern Somalia were the self-declared secessionist state of Somaliland has managed to provide a generally peaceful and lawful environment, the south has seen more localised efforts to re-establish rule of law in which clan elders, businessmen and the *sharia* courts play a role.

1.1.2 Political economy of war themes as they relate to southern Somalia

Working in Somalia organisations engage with a system that is characterised by unequal distribution of power and resources. Le Sage (1998) states that, 'orthodox explanations of the war in Somalia overstate the influence of clans and environmental stress and understate the economic stratification of society and the role of self-interested elites'. Competition between the militia factions since 1991 has served to perpetuate long-term patterns of alienation and exploitation. While aid organisations aim to target less advantaged sections of the population and attempt to alleviate the negative economic impacts that exist within a stratified system, access to such groups is not without contact with and consent from those who hold positions of power. Mitigating the effects of extremely uneven distribution of aid is not a straightforward process but is one where humanitarian response and the design of programmes should include an analysis of the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution. Such an analysis should include the potential for programming itself to exacerbate conflict (see Le Billon, 2000). Information gathering is a major challenge; those profiting politically and economically are highly unlikely to advertise the fact, least of all to a potential or actual source of such profit. Menkhaus (2002) notes that, 'unwillingness to assess implications of a war economy may also be characteristic of external actors'. As one example he notes that aid agencies can be quick to dismiss claims that food aid is diverted by warring parties.

The challenges faced by international organisations in Somalia during the early 1990s were extreme. Looting and diversion of relief aid was widespread. Many prominent businessmen in Mogadishu began to make their fortunes in the war economy of the early 1990s. The large-scale UN, ICRC and International non-governmental organisation (INGO) presence in Somalia in 1993/4 made profits in procurement, transport services, diverted food aid, weapons, and scrap metal available (ICG, 2002; UNDP, 2001; Menkhaus, 2002). Insecurity during this period promoted the now well established use of armed protection by aid agencies working in Somalia.

The business class has, more recently, become an independent political force in southern Somalia. Wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs have considerable influence. In 1999 in Mogadishu leading businessmen outflanked militia leaders from their own clans by refusing to pay them taxes, instead buying directly the backing of individual militia fighters. The businessmen then financed their own security forces and judiciary. The management of judiciary was 'subcontracted' to local *sharia* courts (ICG, 2002:3; Menkhaus, 2000:4–5). Even outside of Mogadishu businessmen are now capable of acting independently of militia. The ICG report (2002) that the international community

may have played a part in reducing the power of the militia and faction leaders and the decreased political affiliation along factional lines since the mid-1990s. 'In the past, large aid flows provided warlords with funds, and international mediation efforts gave them political legitimacy. In the absence of external recognition and resources, warlords have seen their influence dim' (ICG, 2002:3–4).

Recent analysis (ICG, 2002; Menkhaus, 2002) suggests that merchants, now more independent from factional affiliation, have moved into more 'legitimate commerce' than was the case in the early 1990s. This may in turn suggest that the necessary dealings that organisations have with businessmen are less questionable than was the case in the early 1990s. Lack of a state monopoly on security and the necessity of safeguarding trade convoys and businesses have created opportunities for private services that provide security. International aid agencies continue to employ armed security personnel to protect both stocks and staff. The militia and ex-militia employed by organisations would not generally be considered as stakeholders in a return to a system of law and order and can resort to extortion and threats against their employers. They tend, however, to be more strongly affiliated to the burgeoning 'security companies' than to active service in militia factions.

The benefits of economic growth are unevenly distributed in southern Somalia and there are sharp variations in local living conditions and income. The generation of wealth by entrepreneurs in transit, protection, money-transfers and telecommunications companies masks the living conditions of the majority of Somali households. The US$ is currency of choice for major business transactions and savings although Somali shillings continue to be used in Somalia. Wealthy sections of society who have access to remittances and hard currency are much less affected by the recent major injections of new Somali shillings than small-scale agriculturalists and poorer sections of the population in general. While analysis of webs of social and economic entitlements and interactions that structure and sustain livelihoods should be present in the programming decisions of agencies, disentanglement from that complex is not a possibility unless it informs a case for disengagement.

1.1.3 Livelihood systems in southern Somalia

This Section has been adapted from Le Sage and Majid, 2002. A useful starting point for an analysis of livelihood systems in Somalia is the Household (Food) Economy research undertaken by the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) for Somalia.[1] This food security early warning and information unit has been collecting food security related information on Somalia for over five years. In that time it has been using the Household (Food) Economy Approach (HEA)[2] to categorise and describe different population groups in the country. Over twenty different food economy groups have been identified and described throughout the country. Each of these food economy groups fall into one of five broadly defined 'livelihood systems': pastoral, agro-pastoral, riverine, fishing (coastal) and urban.

FSAU has well developed information on pastoral, agro-pastoral and riverine systems – these are described in more detail below. FSAU also has more limited information of fishing and urban groups. The ICRC projects described in the case study are found in pastoral, agro-pastoral and riverine areas. The SC–UK project is located in a riverine area with some extension into agro-pastoral groups. Further details on the riverine are given in the SC–UK case study.

[1] The FSAU has a network of Somali professionals based in-country who collect and interpret a wide variety of data and information, including rainfall, crop production, livestock conditions, and market prices. Their reports are further analysed in Nairobi and disseminated in different forms to the aid community.

[2] The term and methodology originate with SC–UK, and is now often referred to as Household Economy Analysis. Simply put, food economy groups comprise individuals and communities who (i) share similar methods and patterns of accessing food, income, and (ii) are at risk to similar events that may undermine this access.

Pastoralists. In general pastoralists derive the majority of their food needs from the purchase of cereals, sugar, and oil. Milk and milk products comprise a significant additional food source. Income is mainly obtained from the sale of livestock and livestock products. Poorer wealth groups, with their smaller herd sizes, obtain a significant amount of food/income from activities such as petty trade, bush-product collection and casual labour. Intra-community gifts to the poor, such as lactating livestock, food and cash, are also common. The long, dry *jilaal* season is usually the most difficult time for pastoralists and their animals, when energy needs are high (during the search for water and pasture), and milk production and livestock prices low.

In general, pastoralists have been considered the least vulnerable to food insecurity over recent years due to a combination of political and natural circumstances, including the politico-military strength of the pastoralist clans and the mobility of their livestock-based assets. These generally positive trends have been interrupted by drought conditions and two bans on livestock imports from Somalia in recent years.

Factors undermining pastoral livelihoods include:

- Restricted grazing mobility due to insecurity
- Population expansion and sedentarisation
- Lack, and breakdown of, traditional (or other) pastoral environmental management systems
- Poor livestock health care systems in an unregulated drug market
- Conflict-induced asset depletion
- Increasing commercial and communal debt
- Poor terms of trade in some areas due to distance from markets
- Border closures and trade disruptions – livestock import/export bans
- Unregulated trading system, provides limited returns to producers
- High rates of expenditure on social services and production inputs (e.g. livestock drugs and treatment)

Factors sustaining pastoral livelihoods include:

- Increased sales of animals even during times of poor terms of trade
- Mobile assets, useful in times of conflict and drought
- Temporarily decreasing the household size and consumption burden by sending children to live with better-off relatives
- Increasing commercial and communal borrowing
- Rural-to-urban migration to seek employment opportunities
- Increasing reliance of poorer households on the generosity of their kin
- Increased exploitation of natural resources – collection/production of firewood, charcoal, aromatic gums

Reaching and working successfully with highly mobile pastoral communities, regardless of the security context, is notoriously difficult. Interventions in this sector are therefore generally limited to livestock health programmes and some water interventions. Education and some income diversification in localised areas are also beginning. ICRC interventions in pastoral areas are focused on the rehabilitation of water-related infrastructure.

Agro-pastoralists. Typically, agro-pastoralists derive the majority of their food from their own crop production, own milk production and some purchase. Income comes from the sale of livestock and livestock products, the sale of crops, and for poorer groups a variety of petty trade, casual labour and collection of bush products. Intra-community redistribution is also important for poorer groups.

In general, agro-pastoral households in Somalia have been considered the most food-insecure populations in recent years. Their vulnerability is due to a combination of natural and man-made factors. Agro-pastoral populations in southern Somalia primarily come from politically and militarily marginal clans, and have been amongst the greatest victims of violence since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 (Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996). Combined with poor rains and harvests, the resulting asset losses (of both food stocks and livestock) and displacement have resulted in large-scale food deficits.

Factors undermining agro-pastoral livelihoods include:

- Poor rains and consecutive seasons of crop failure
- Conflict-induced asset depletion of fixed and immobile assets (e.g. land)
- Trade disruptions due to conflict and border closures
- Physical isolation from ports and services in Somalia's main urban centres
- Lack of security from violence and economic exploitation, especially for weaker social groups
- Increasing commercial and communal debt
- Crop pests, disease and bird attacks
- Decreasing levels of assistance from international aid agencies

Strategies sustaining agro-pastoral livelihoods include:

- Sales of household food stocks and livestock assets
- Seasonal migration to urban areas for employment
- Intra-community social support
- Increasing commercial and communal borrowing
- Selling part of a herd in order to buy fodder to keep the remainder alive
- Slaughtering new born calves in order to protect the mother
- Reduction of food consumption to below minimal nutritional levels for short periods of time

Interventions focusing on this group include the distribution of seed and tools and agricultural extension activities and livestock and human health programmes. As within livelihood groups, activities in the water sector have provided a point for intervention. ICRC interventions concerning agro-pastoral populations have focused on water and vegetable production.

Riverine farmers. Riverine farmers normally get the majority of their food and income from the production of irrigated food and cash crops. Poorer groups often have good casual labour opportunities on other farms, and also engage in petty trading and the collection of bush products. This group tends to have very small herds or no livestock at all. Riverine resources, such as fruit trees, wild foods and small bank-side plots can be important assets.

This group has suffered for two main reasons in the last ten years. Firstly, in many areas, riverine groups are politically marginalised, vulnerable to discrimination by well mobilised and well armed pastoralist militia who regard agriculturalists as belonging to a lower caste. In some areas, riverine groups have been forced off their former land holdings when mutually beneficial alliances have not been created with their neighbours. Secondly, heavy flooding, such as the El Nino floods in 1997 combined with the decrepit irrigation infrastructure, creates a constant risk.

Factors undermining riverine livelihoods:

- Lack of available land or secure tenure
- Lack of capital for land preparation, labour and fuel for water pumps
- High production costs and low market prices for produce
- Lack of access to and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
- Lack of protection from seasonal flooding
- High market costs for fuel
- Lack of security from violence and economic exploitation

Strategies sustaining riverine livelihoods:

- Community labour to rehabilitate and maintain irrigation infrastructure
- Petty trade
- Casual employment – particularly agricultural labour
- Temporary migration to urban areas to seek employment
- Fish and wild-food consumption and sales

Investment in such riverine infrastructure as canals has been a significant input by the aid community in secure areas. These types of interventions are relatively visible, are seen to target a marginal group and to assist national-level food production and therefore food security. This type of intervention is often combined with agricultural extension and irrigation management training. Interventions concerning the riverine group are detailed in both the ICRC and SC case studies.

1.1.4 Programming possibilities

The mid-1990s saw something of a turning point for humanitarian efforts in Somalia. Le Sage and Majid note that changes in programming strategies were a response that attempted to address the implication of classical relief programming in financing war efforts and the problems of maintaining expatriate presence in Somalia given the security constraints (Le Sage and Majid, 2002:12). The Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established in 1995. This voluntary body which includes donor, NGO, and UN bodies as members is designed to facilitate information sharing and coordinate programming and policy formulation and 'avoid the mistakes of large-scale, top-down aid programmes providing unsustainable social services until a crisis ends' (Le Sage and Majid, 2002). The SACB handbook (SACB, 2001) states that the creation of the SACB aimed to facilitate donors in developing a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources available for Somalia. The SACB Project Matrix identifies the activities of SACB partners in Somalia; these activities are categorised geographically and by sector. Sectors within the SACB system (health and nutrition, food security and rural development, water, sanitation and infrastructure, education and governance) are further split into subsections within the Project Matrix. Some sub-sections relate explicitly to relief-style programming (e.g. 'emergency water and sanitation') others are not explicitly related to relief/development continuum (e.g. 'livestock').

The SACB's Guiding Principles of Operation (SACB, 2002) states within the section role of the international community that assistance shall seek to save lives, reduce human suffering and promote self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods for all populations in Somalia (SACB, 2002 emphasis added). The SACB has not been noted as providing a strong emphasis on promoting sustainable livelihoods nor the understanding of the political economy within which livelihood programming should be contextualised. However lobbying by individuals involved with the SACB and FSAU has created an environment where livelihoods programming is promoted within the humanitarian community and to some extent the influence of this has been felt. The ICRC programme described in the following case study was in a large part inspired and developed as a consequence of a general environment where livelihood programming has been promoted.

However, neither analysis of the SACB framework, nor assessments of environments conducive to particular programming hold the only keys to understanding programming choice and options in Somalia. The kind of programming, however represented within the SACB Project Matrix, is largely dependant on well used programming styles employed by organisations in their programming throughout the world, their experience (where it exists) of working in Somalia and the way Somalia is characterised as a place to implement programmes. While problems inherent in working within southern Somalia can be seen to offer a context for change in programming they can also be seen as a factor which tends to encourage 'safe' programming, i.e., tried and tested

programming styles used by organisations in other contexts, particularly those described as ‘emergencies’. One example is nutrition programming in the form of ‘supplementary feeding’, models of which are used worldwide in emergency contexts. Action Contre la Faim, as one example, uses feeding programmes as a basic response to ‘nutritional emergencies’ and has done so over a number of years. Despite running programmes in other countries which are more akin to livelihood programmes than emergency feeding (income generation for livelihood support as one example), in Somalia such interventions tend to be less likely to be implemented. Security conditions within Somalia and limited expatriate presence can result in organisations considering ‘classic’ programming styles with which they have experience as being the more viable option.

Organisations such as SC–UK and CARE that operate in contexts considered suited to ‘development’ programmes as well as ‘emergency’ contexts appear to be better placed to implement programmes that consider support to livelihoods rather than emergency distributions. This is likely a consequence of being able to apply intervention styles used outside situations understood as ‘emergencies’ to southern Somalia. In practice this translates as agricultural programming that aims to increase yield through the rehabilitation of irrigation systems. Organisations that are specialists in working in situations of crisis such as ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have a stronger tendency towards programming that addresses basic needs over short periods of time. In southern Somalia such programmes tend to be repeated on a regular basis.

Donor support to Somalia has been criticised as limited and short-term in perspective. NGOs have to operate in accordance with strict donor conditions that aim to increase quality of strategy, reporting and programme design. Agencies tend to find the requirements difficult to meet. A current example is the European Commission (EC) requirement concerning community participation, standards of which are found to be difficult to achieve by funded NGOs. The EC have made the collection of baseline information mandatory for funded NGOs prior to project implementation, this should aid monitoring and impact analysis and encourage a better understanding of livelihood systems. The FSAU provide livelihood-related information to implementing agencies in Somalia. They are most associated with the production of monthly food security updates, seasonal crop assessments, early warning of potential crises and the generation of statistics on food aid needs. Although the information is fairly well used there is only limited understanding of the household economy methodology by implementing agencies and there are limits to the extent to which the FSAU information is translated into programming options.

The UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) collects information on Somalia but is rarely sought out by implementing agencies. The UN Security Office is more closely attached to UN agencies in the field because any potential or actual programme site must be cleared through this Security Office sites are also evacuated when the security office assesses this as necessary. The EC have an influence on NGO security procedure and provide some political information. The EC also controls the flight system used by the NGOs it funds. ICRC stands generally outside these systems as it charters its own aircraft and makes security-related decisions based on its own analysis. ICRC officially has ‘observer’ status within the SACB. In practice this means ICRC staff members attend SACB meetings, offer programming information to the Project Matrix but do not necessarily follow SACB policy and practice for field operations. It is not uncommon for ICRC to stand and act outside of co-ordination or operational guidelines for UN agencies and NGOs. Acting on the basis of its specific mandate and particular relationship with interlocutors in the contexts in which the organisation works, ICRC tend to assert the right to act as an institution with some independence from the wider body of humanitarian organisations. In the Somali context the basic rationale is that ICRC have negotiated and developed relationships which allow access to the field and intend to keep these agreements stable. The SACB has developed guidelines that involve local authority’s control over access to an extent that ICRC’s working relationship does not.

1.2 Introduction to ICRC

1.2.1 ICRC

The ICRC acts on the basis of the specific mandate it has received from the States bound by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The mandate is to protect and assist victims of war and internal violence and to promote compliance with international humanitarian law. This includes the task of monitoring the treatment of prisoners of war and other people detained in connection with conflict, and a right to propose its services in order to alleviate the suffering of all victims. The ICRC endeavours to draw attention to violations of international humanitarian law, to spread knowledge of this law and to promote its development. As the founding member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the ICRC directs and co-ordinates the international work of the Movement's components in connection with armed conflict and internal violence.

The ICRC's activities are aimed at protecting and assisting the victims of armed conflict and internal violence so as to preserve their physical integrity and their dignity and to enable them to regain their autonomy as quickly as possible. The ICRC is independent of all governments and international organisations, the ICRC is impartial, it's criterion for action is the victim's needs. The organisation currently works in over 50 countries around the world, in addition to its operational delegations the ICRC has set up a network of regional delegations covering countries not directly affected by armed conflict. Contributions from governments, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, supranational organisations, non-governmental organisations, public and private sources and legacies fund its operations.

1.2.2 ICRC programming as it relates to livelihoods

The primary aim of ICRC assistance operations is to protect victims' lives and health, to ensure that the consequences of conflict – injury, hunger, disease or exposure to the elements – do not jeopardise their future. ICRC aims to maintain its independence throughout all stages of relief operations and to ensure that supplies are distributed in compliance with the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Responding to immediate needs is now, where possible, combined with aiding the maintenance or re-establishment of the population's own means of survival. This strategy has been referred to in ICRC as 'agricultural and veterinary rehabilitation' and became part of ICRC's response to food crises resulting from armed conflict in the early 1980s. The first ICRC agricultural rehabilitation programme began in Cambodia in 1980. The programmes include seed, tools, fertilizer and pesticide distributions and vaccination programmes. Some training and promotion of sustainable agricultural methods have also been included.

In the ICRC, assistance activities fall within the Assistance Division that includes the Economic Security Unit, the Water and Habitat Unit, and the Health Services Unit. Currently, practice within the Economic Security Unit is described by ICRC as falling into three types of humanitarian activity: economic support, survival relief, and economic rehabilitation. To quote an ICRC report:

> 'Economic support aims to protect the vital means of production of conflict victims, so they can maintain their productive capacity and economic self-sufficiency at the household level as much as possible. Survival relief aims to protect the lives of conflict victims by giving them access to the economic goods essential to their survival when they can no longer obtain these by their own means. Economic rehabilitation aims to support conflict victims to restore their means of production, and where possible, regain their economic self-sufficiency' (ICRC, 2000:7).

While there is debate within ICRC concerning the inadequacy of the relief – development continuum, the majority of delegates working in the field tend to understand programming and describe programmes within this framework.

1.2.3 ICRC's past interventions in Somalia

The ICRC's involvement with Somalia began with the official recognition of the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) in 1969. ICRC sent First Aid teams to Somalia during the 1977/8 Odagen War; the teams treated conflict victims and implemented medical projects for refugees. Between 1977 and 1988 ICRC delegates visited Ethiopian prisoners of war in Somalia and in 1988 the ICRC organised the repatriation of thousands of detainees. A permanent office of the ICRC was opened in Mogadishu in 1982. Health posts and dispensaries were set up in northern Somalia in co-operation with the SRCS. The following year a surgical hospital was established in Berbera.

The outbreak of civil war and the major emergency in 1991 led to one of ICRC's biggest relief operations in its history. The organisation delivered dry food rations to more than a million people and cooked food to 600,000 people daily. In 1992, the ICRC supported the opening of Keysaney hospital in northern Mogadishu by the SRCS. Other programmes included well rehabilitation, livestock vaccination campaigns and seed and tools distribution concurrent with food aid. During this period ICRC aimed at implementing programmes to protect or restore people's productive capacity while still supplying immediate food assistance and medical care.

Following the emergency and the greater presence of aid agencies in Somalia during the mid-1990s ICRC gradually reduced its emergency relief efforts and focused on restoring family links, visiting detained persons and providing medical assistance. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, the ICRC delegation decided to move from Mogadishu to Nairobi in 1994. The organisation began to run programmes from Nairobi by working through its Somali field officers and weekly expatriate visits. In 1997 thousands of Somalis were left homeless, hungry and sick by devastating floods. The ICRC reacted by launching an emergency operation to airlift food, medicines and sanitation equipment for the victims. In 2000, the ICRC supported the opening of Madina hospital; a cost-recovery system has since been put in place.

The second case study within this paper details one current ICRC project. The ICRC Community Intervention Project (CIP) in southern Somalia aims to provide an economic input into selected communities to aid households most in need overcome a limited period of economic insecurity. It also aims to provide longer-term support through the rehabilitation of a relevant economic infrastructure to benefit the whole community. The CIP is a small part of ICRC's programming in Somalia. The CIP shows the strongest link with the theme supporting livelihoods of all the ICRC activities within Somalia. It is also illustrative, to some extent, of a point of departure from previous programming by ICRC in Somalia.

1.3 Introduction to Save the Children

Save the Children has a Global Programme Strategy (GPS), which informs and is adapted to regional and country contexts and strategic plans. Underlying the organisation's entire work is a framework of child rights, as expressed in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other human rights instruments.

One of the very broad themes that is highlighted in the GPS is that

> '[the SC] approach is very different from the short-term humanitarian relief efforts undertaken by many agencies. SC seeks to prevent such emergencies (e.g. by looking to improve food security), to base action on good analysis, to provide material and other assistance in ways that assist long-term recovery' (SC–UK, 1997:1).

The six core areas in which SC works are:

- Social Protection, Welfare and Inclusion
- Education
- Health
- Food Security and Nutrition
- HIV/AIDS
- Children and Work

These six areas, which provide the focus of SC's global work are outlined in the Programme Strategic Plan (developed in 1999) with gender and disability providing cross-cutting themes (SC–UK, 2000a).

1.3.1 SC programming as it relates to livelihoods

SC as an organisation has experience and expertise in situations of both 'emergency' and 'development', and aims to balance the two. The organisational philosophy stresses the need for timely emergency interventions to preserve livelihoods and protect children's rights, rather than belated 'life-saving' approaches.

The organisation has identified a number of advocacy priority areas.[3] These are:

1. Economics
2. Emergencies
3. Basic services
4. Citizenship
5. Child rights

Across the priority areas, 'the cross-cutting issues of gender, disability and livelihoods analysis are crucial dimensions' (SC–UK, 2002:10).

The meaning and use of livelihoods analysis is articulated in a number of different ways. It is recognised as a tool, with multiple dimensions. For SC, 'livelihood analysis constitutes social and economic research, at inter- and intra-household and community levels with linkages to the wider social and economic environment' (SC–UK, 2000a:6).

SC's development and use of the HEA methodology over many years plays an important part in their interpretation of 'livelihoods'.

> '*Livelihoods* includes household income and expenditure patterns, participation, social capital and the environment as they relate to basic needs – food, water, health, education and shelter. The development of a livelihood analysis methodology is an extension of the household food economy model' (SC–UK, 2000a).

[3] These five priority areas are different from the six core areas previously mentioned. However SC is currently making a shift from its previous core areas to a new global strategic focus based on the priority advocacy areas mentioned.

In practice, what this means and how it is used for programming will vary according to the local context and the interpretation (or lack of) by programme staff. At a global organisational level the HEA approach has made limited in-roads into informing programme design, implementation and evaluation to date.

In terms of the Somalia programme, 'emergencies' provides the priority area for SC–UK's focus. The goal for this priority area is to minimise children's suffering due to conflicts and natural disasters. The four objectives are:

1. The international community provides appropriate aid for 'silent emergencies' to meet the survival and protection rights of children in equitable, appropriate and sustainable ways;
2. Governments, humanitarian agencies and donors maintain minimum standards of practice in protection of children affected by emergencies, especially work with separated children and child soldiers;
3. Governments, humanitarian agencies and donors improve food security and nutrition information systems in order to strengthen preparedness and responses to acute and chronic food and nutrition problems affecting children, with a focus on building the capacities of vulnerable households to prevent and mitigate the impact of crises;
4. Donors, governments and humanitarian agencies provide timely and high standard health, nutrition, education and HIV/AIDS-related services for children in emergencies (SC–UK, 2001–5).

1.3.2 Background to SC's past interventions in Somalia

SC–UK has been active in Somalia since the 1950s. In the 1970s and 1980s it was working in the north of the country running a large programme in the Refugee Health Unit, in collaboration with the then Mogadishu-based Ministry of Health.

SC–UK remained in Mogadishu from 1991 to 1993, during the collapse of the state and resultant chaos. By 1993 the organisation had expanded to include Mogadishu, Belet Weyn, Bardera and Jalalaxi. In 1994 the field office in Mogadishu was moved to Nairobi, in common with many other organisations. By 1997, the Belet Weyn Programme was the only project area. All other programmes had close down in the mid-1990s due to a combination of insecurity, strained relations with local authorities and internal evaluations showing programmes to be too large, very expensive and having limited impact.

Emergency work during the period 1991 to 2000 included:

- Supplementary feeding programmes in southern/central Somalia
- Mother and child health care (MCH) for malnourished children in Mogadishu, Bardera, Belet Weyn and Jalalaxi
- Provision of food aid, shelter materials, latrines and wells in camps for displaced people
- Provision of shelter materials, seeds and tools in response to flooding

With only one programme base in Somalia, namely Belet Weyn during 1998/9 the country office carefully considered options for developing the geographical scope of its work within the framework of a now well defined country programme strategy (2000–4). The Somalia Country Strategy Paper (CSP) (SC–UK, 2000c) identified four key strategic objectives that the programme aimed to address in Somalia:

1. Enable Somali children to have access to better health and appropriate and equitable basic education;
2. Improve access for Somali children to enough food for their proper growth and development;

3. Achieve greater protection, care and social inclusion for children in vulnerable circumstances who are subject to abuse, discrimination and/or who are disadvantaged [girls subjected to Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and children in institutions] and to develop a better understanding of issues related to HIV/AIDS and urban poor children;
4. Be prepared to respond to emergencies where basic needs are not met and where SC has the capacity to assist in a timely and effective manner.

It was decided that Somaliland, where SC has a long association and where the political environment was more stable, provided the programme with an environment conducive to addressing key issues affecting children through strong, potential partnerships. In 2000 SC re-established its programme in Somaliland, currently limited to the education sector.

SC–UK was also instrumental in the creation and development of the FSAU for Somalia. This unit was housed within the World Food Programme (WFP) from 1994 to 2000 and has since moved to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The major involvement of SC–UK was in promoting the use of the HEA for food needs and food security assessments. From 1997 until 2001 SC–UK had a full-time HEA specialist seconded to FSAU.[4] As this Unit covers the whole country SC–UK has had an interest in the overall food security status of Somalia.

The following section is a case study of the entire SC–UK programme in Belet Weyn, southern Somalia. It is a historical description of organisational change and development that has brought SC–UK to a position recently where in many respects it is operating a livelihoods-sensitive programme.

A map of Somalia is provided in Figure 1.

[4] Since the move to FAO FSAU has essentially adopted HEA fully as its analytical framework, it now has strong internal HEA capacity, and the seconded link has ended.



***Source*:** FSAU-FAO

Figure 1 Somalia, major food economy groups and areas, prepared by the Food Security Assessment Unit of FAO (FSAU–FAO)